New developments in family ethics: an introduction by Betzler, Monika & Löschke, Jörg
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
New developments in family ethics: an introduction
Betzler, Monika ; Löschke, Jörg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-01306001
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-169672
Journal Article
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Betzler, Monika; Löschke, Jörg (2016). New developments in family ethics: an introduction. Journal of
Moral Philosophy, 13(6):641-651.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-01306001
New Developments in Family Ethics: An Introduction 
Monika Betzler (LMU Munich) and Jörg Löschke (University of Bern) 
 
Over the last three decades, moral philosophy has seen a revived interest in the ethics of 
personal relationships, especially in the question of so-called associative duties: what do 
parties of special relationships owe to each other, and on what grounds? How can such 
associative duties – or special obligations,1 as some authors call them – be reconciled with the 
idea that morality is characterized by the impartial point of view? After all, it is our partiality 
to our intimates that more often than not seems to conflict with the demands of morality 
impartially conceived.2  
It is now common to acknowledge that at least some personal relationships ground such duties. 
After all, it does not only seem simply wrong to entirely disregard the special demands that 
friends, partners, or children make on us; we also seem to lose valuable forms of engagement 
that make up, in part at least, who we are. One strand within moral theorizing has devoted 
attention to integrating those special duties arising from our personal relationships within an 
impartial outlook on morality. Another strand of moral theorizing examines more closely the 
source of such duties and what conditions a personal relationship must fulfill so that partiality 
to one’s friends, partners, or children can be regarded as legitimate. After all, only if the 
                                                          
1 See Diane Jeske, “Special Obligations,” in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2014). URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/special-
obligations/. 
2 See John Cottingham & Brian Feltham, (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special 
Relationships, and the Wider World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) for an overview 
of the debate about this conflict.  
source of associative duties can be located and if partiality to our intimates proves justifiable 
does it make sense for moral theories to worry about integrating personal relationships and the 
moral demands they make on us.  
One condition for a relationship to ground duties seems to be a relationship-well-being-nexus: 
a relationship that contributes to the well-being of its participants seems to be a legitimate 
source of special obligations, and a relationship that does not carries a significant burden of 
proof, if one wants to uphold the claim that it grounds special obligations. Interestingly, the 
widely acknowledged fact that personal relationships are constitutive of our well-being has 
led rival moral theorists, especially consequentialists and Kantians, to reconsider their basic 
assumptions, and to reformulate their theories to accommodate the special duties that arise 
from such relationships. To allude to a just few such attempts, many consequentialists took 
the indirect route and argued along the following lines:3  Realizing the value of personal 
relationships implies responding to special duties that, in turn, demand that we do not 
constantly deliberate about maximizing general well-being. What we should therefore do is 
not deliberate about maximizing general well-being, but simply respond to special duties as 
they arise within personal relationships. In the end, however, it is this default attitude towards 
fulfilling our special duties that leads to the maximization of general well-being. Kantians, by 
contrast, try to respond to the worry that the Categorical Imperative and the procedure of 
universalization cannot accommodate special obligations by interpreting them as instances of 
                                                          
3 See Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984), pp. 134–171; Philip Pettit, “The Consequentialist 
Perspective,” in M. Baron, P. Pettit & M. Slote, (eds.), Three Methods of Ethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997), pp. 92–174. 
imperfect duties, that is, as positive duties that allow for discretion over how exactly they are 
to be fulfilled.4  
Other moral theories, such as deontology and virtue ethics, which have more natural resources 
to accommodate the importance of personal relationships, started to develop their views more 
in light of the challenge that personal relationships pose to moral theorizing. Deontologists are 
keen to explore the agent-relative reasons and duties to which personal relationships give rise, 
and which they think stand in contrast to agent-neutral reasons.5 Those inspired by virtue 
ethics delve into the question of what virtues it takes to realize personal relationships, and 
what character traits personal relationships themselves foster.6 They also consider a virtuous 
character to be a ground for associative duties.7 
While all these debates start from the assumption that personal relationships are, in principle 
at least, valuable, and should therefore be accommodated by moral theorizing, they have 
neither provided an explanation as to what precisely is of value so that associative duties are 
legitimately generated, nor studied the intricacies of particular kinds of personal relationships. 
More often than not, they more or less tacitly focus on friendship, but never examine in more 
detail the ways in which various kinds of relationships differ, and what precisely characterizes 
                                                          
4 Marcia Baron, “Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the ‘One Thought Too Many’ Objection,” 
in M. Betzler, (ed.), Kant’s Ethics of Virtue (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 245–
277. 
5 David McNaughton & Piers Rawling, “On Defending Deontology,” Ratio 11 (1998), pp. 
37–54. 
6 Christopher Heath Wellman, “Friends, Compatriots, and Special Political Obligations,” 
Political Theory 29 (2001), pp. 217–236; Hugh LaFollette, Personal Relationships: Love, 
Identity, and Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 
7 Jennifer Whiting, “Impersonal Friends,” The Monist 74 (1991), pp. 3–29. 
them. Also, their main focus has been how moral theories of whatever brand can incorporate 
relationships and the special duties they engender, and not what it is precisely that grounds the 
duties to which particular relationships give rise in the first place.  
Recently, however, this has started to change. There has been a considerable growth of 
literature not only on what explains our partiality to others, but also on what characterizes 
particular kinds of relationships and their specific value. While some claim that it is the 
shared history of entertaining a particular relationship that grounds special duties,8 others 
think that it is rather the individual value of the person to which one is related that grounds 
them.9 As for the particular value of a relationship – the value that explains why partiality is 
legitimate rather than unwarranted – the so-called relationship goods view has gained a lot of 
currency. To the extent that we can be taken to have an interest in these goods we can be said 
to have reasons for those goods to be realized. To the extent that such goods, however, can 
only be realized by fulfilling corresponding duties, we have reasons to do what these duties 
demand of us. Different kinds of relationships can bring about different kinds of goods, and to 
the extent that such goods can be realized the parties involved have different corresponding 
duties depending on the goods they are thought to bring about.10  
The personal relationship that has received the most attention over the last ten years is the 
family. One of the reasons for this new interest in familial relationships is that the family has 
undergone dramatic challenges and changes. Couples can be married or unmarried. There can 
                                                          
8 Niko Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” The Philosophical Review 112 (2003), pp. 
135–189. 
9 Simon Keller, Partiality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
10 Simon Keller, The Limits of Loyalty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Jonathan Seglow, Defending Associative Duties (London: Routledge, 2013); Adam Swift & 
Harry Brighouse, Family Values (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
be single parents and same-sex marriages. Children can be genetically related or adopted. And 
even if they are genetically related they can be procreated in different ways due to procreative 
technologies. Given this more liberal conception of the family,11and in light of the new 
technological challenges of procreating and childbearing, the family has become a new focus 
for those interested in personal relationships and their normative implications.  
The family has proved to be a fruitful field of philosophical inquiry whose focus has 
continued to widen. Regarding its normative implications, philosophers have begun to focus 
on the parent–child relationship and some of the duties that are implied by this. In particular, 
they have focused on parental duties – duties that parents have towards their young,12 but 
growing children – and filial duties – the duties that grown children have towards their parents, 
and the content and ground of those duties.13Another area of investigation is what rights 
                                                          
11 For a defense of a liberal view of the family, see David Archard, The Family. A Liberal 
Defense (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
12 Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” in W. Aiken & H. LaFollette, (eds.), 
Whose Child? Children’s Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power (Totowa, NJ: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1980); Matthew S. Liao, “The Right of Children to be Loved,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 14 (2006), pp. 420–440; Joseph Millum, “How Do We Acquire Parental 
Responsibilities?,” Social Theory and Practice 34 (2008), pp. 74–93; Norvin Richards, The 
Ethics of Parenthood (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
13 Christina Hoff Sommers, “Filial Morality,” The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), pp. 439–
456; Nancy Jecker, “Are Filial Duties Unfounded?,” American Philosophical Quarterly 26 
(1989), pp. 73–80; Simon Keller, “Four Theories of Filial Duties,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 56 (2006), pp. 254–274; Jane English, “What Do Grown Children Owe Their 
Parents?,” in O. O’Neill & W. Ruddick, (eds.), Having Children. Philosophical and Legal 
Reflections on Parenthood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 351–356. 
parents should have with regard to rearing their children and what precisely grounds these 
rights. This pertains, among other things, to the parental right to raise and educate their 
children,14 and instill values in them.15 Conversely, the rights of children – for example with 
regard to their physical integrity, political participation, and their own future more generally – 
has become another important field of inquiry. Still there are many areas left untouched by 
current thinking about family relationships. While the bulk of the literature devoted its 
attention to rights and duties as they arise within an ongoing parent–child relationship, much 
is still left to be explored with regard to the rights and duties of parents to start such a 
relationship in the first place. Similarly, the potential responsibilities younger children have 
towards their parents remains an understudied subject, and there are many other normative 
intricacies of the family dynamic that await further scrutiny. The papers in this special issue 
deal with these issues, and thus continue the debate about rights and duties in the broader 
family context.  
Each text can be seen as dealing with the question of rights and duties that are implied by the 
family in general and the parent–child relationship in particular. This is not to say that these 
are the only questions worth discussing – ontological questions, such as the question of what a 
family is and how it is constituted, as well as questions concerning extended family, are 
interesting and worthwhile. One might also ask whether the whole approach that attempts to 
understand the normativity of family relationship in terms of rights and duties is misleading 
and should be replaced by an analysis of the normativity of family relationships in terms of 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Norvin Richards, The Ethics of Parenthood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010).  
15 Adam Swift & Harry Brighouse, Family Values (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013). For a critical view on the “comprehensive enrolment” of children see Matthew Clayton, 
Justice and Legitimacy of Upbringing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
virtues or reasons. However, as the papers collected here show, a focus on rights and duties 
can still cover philosophical ground that has previously been neglected. It is still possible to 
ask new and interesting questions within that framework. This special issue therefore focuses 
on the framework of rights and duties to gain further insight into the normative implications 
of the family.  
The papers collected for this special issue thus share the same methodological framework, but 
each paper applies it from a novel point of view. They not only ask what duties parents or 
grown children have vis-á-vis the other party. They extend the focus to include the duties of 
young children to their parents – something that most authors seem to assume does not exist – 
and to the normative dangers that family duties may present. Another important issue is 
whether rights and duties not only exist once a parent–child relationship is already in place, 
but whether there might be upstream duties and rights that define what kind of parent–child 
relationship agents may legitimately have. This special issues aims to highlight these topics 
regarding the parent–child relationship from a new perspective. 
Matthew Liao, in his “Biological Parenting as a Human Right,” argues for a (defeasible) right 
to parent one’s biological offspring, and he understands this right as a human right. Liao 
understands human rights as grounded in the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life 
– a life that is spent pursuing valuable, basic activities. The class of basic activities is quite 
limited: many activities are valuable, and can be highly valued by individuals, such as 
creating great works of art, or helping others in need. Such activities are valuable and 
important to individuals. By contrast, basic activities are activities that are important to a 
human being qua that human being’s life as a whole. Given that humans cannot lead good 
lives without engaging in basic activities, these basic activities ground human rights; more 
specifically, human rights aim at securing the fundamental conditions – goods, capacities, and 
options – for engaging in basic activities, and hence for pursuing good lives. 
According to Liao, biological parenting – i.e., the parenting of one’s biological offspring – is 
a basic activity. Biological parenting involves four aspects that jointly explain why it is a 
basic activity: biological parenting involves creating a new life; the new life is the life of a 
right-holder; this new life is created with one’s own genetic material, and one’s own genetic 
material partly determines the genetic identity of the new individual; and as a biological 
parent, one witnesses and shapes the growth and development of the new individual. Each of 
these factors is a good-making feature of biological parenting, and jointly they establish the 
status of biological parenting as a basic activity. 
Because it is a basic activity, humans have a human right to the fundamental conditions for 
pursuing biological parenting. These conditions include bodily integrity, the liberty and 
autonomy to plan and pursue biological parenting, and the power to exclude non-parents from 
trying to be the primary provider for one’s biological children. Hence, humans have a human 
right to procreate and parent their biological children. After developing this human-rights 
account of parental rights, Liao contrasts it with other prominent accounts of the right to 
parent one’s biological children – the property account, the relationship account, the project 
account, the gestational account, and the investment account. Liao claims that the human 
rights account has distinct advantages over these other accounts, and thus constitutes an 
important and novel option in the literature on parental rights. 
Tina Rulli occupies the other end of the argumentative spectrum about the parental right to 
have children. She argues in her “Preferring a Genetically Related Child” that persons who 
want to parent a child have a moral (pro tanto) duty to adopt a child, rather than create new 
life and parent their genetically related child. Her argument proceeds in two steps: first, she 
motivates the idea that there is a pro tanto duty to adopt; second, she argues that the usual 
arguments for preferring a genetically related child, rather than an adopted child, fail to justify 
reasons that outweigh the pro tanto duty to adopt.  
Regarding the first step of her argument, Rulli understands the duty to adopt as a duty of 
assistance that must be understood analogously to the duty to rescue a child from severe harm 
if doing so is possible without significant sacrifice. More specifically, the duty to adopt arises 
from a problem of great magnitude – millions of children are in need of parents – and severity 
– a lack of parental care impairs the development and well-being of children in need of 
parents, possibly for the rest of their lives. This problem could be solved, given that there are 
enough persons who want to parent children and who could adopt children in need of parents, 
and hence, those persons have a pro tanto duty to adopt, rather than create new children to 
parent. 
Regarding the second step of her argument, Rulli accepts that persons have moral options – 
options to favor their own personal interests over those of others, even if that implies 
producing less good than they otherwise could. Moral options aim at giving agents the leeway 
to pursue personal projects – projects that govern their lives and that have positive and non-
trivial value that is independent of the person valuing them. Rulli accepts that moral options 
exist, and that because of such options, persons who do not wish to parent have no duty to 
adopt. However, moral options do not justify procreating, rather than adopting, because the 
desire to parent a genetically related child is not supported by reasons that are weighty enough 
to establish parenting one’s genetic child as a life project that is protected by moral options. 
To establish this claim, Rulli discusses several reasons why persons might prefer to parent 
genetic children: the wish to have a child that resembles them physically, the wish to have a 
child who bears a family resemblance, the wish to have a child that shows psychological 
similarity, the wish to create a symbol of one’s love to one’s partner, the wish to attain some 
kind of immortality, the view that genetic connection is valuable for its own sake, the value of 
creating a child, and the value of pregnancy. These reasons, Rulli argues, are too trivial, 
presuppose the value of genetic connection, are inappropriate in a parental context, or fail to 
make a relevant distinction between genetic and adopted children. Hence, they fail to 
outweigh the pro tanto reason to adopt; the only exception being a woman’s desire to 
experience pregnancy. This desire, as Rulli maintains, can be satisfied by giving birth to one 
child, but it fails to justify creating more than one child. Hence, people who want to 
experience parenthood have a moral duty to adopt children, rather than create children, at 
least after their first genetic child. 
While Liao and Rulli focus on the rights and duties of parents with regard to having children, 
Keller und Mullin take a somewhat different route. They focus on the existing relationship 
between parents and children, but do so in new ways that have so far been neglected. While 
Keller is interested in what can go wrong when it comes to fulfilling one’s familial duties and 
thus devotes himself to the question of how the family context can be a locus of immoral 
behavior, Mullin examines the equally neglected responsibilities parents have with regard to 
desired behavior regarding their younger children.  
In his “Moral Blackmail and the Family,” Simon Keller draws our attention to the 
phenomenon of moral blackmail. He points to its particular significance in family contexts, 
e.g. the gender-related power dynamics that operate in family relationships, and how this can 
be misused – even by public policies. According to Keller, we are confronted with a case of 
moral blackmail if a person A deliberately performs a wrongful act that changes a person B’s 
situation such that it is wrong for B to fail to do what A wants her to do. To illustrate this, 
Keller refers to the example of a brother who agrees to take care of his elderly and frail father 
and bring him to the hospital. Since the brother does not feel like wasting his day with his 
father in the hospital he leaves a message with his sister telling her that he will not be 
available and then turns his phone off for the rest of the day. The sister – who does most of 
the caring for the father – is left with the option of having the father miss an important 
medical procedure or cancelling her own plans. Keller distinguishes moral blackmail from 
cases of prudential and emotional blackmail. In the case of prudential blackmail, a person’s 
choices are manipulated such that they involve greater harm to herself. In emotional 
blackmail, a person’s choices are made emotionally unacceptable. In moral blackmail, by 
contrast, a person’s choices are manipulated by making her circumstances such that she faces 
moral demands that she otherwise would not face. The moral blackmailer tries to make her do 
what he wants her to do by making her alternatives morally unacceptable. Moral blackmail 
thus turns morality against itself, as Keller claims. The person in question is confronted with 
moral reasons that arise due to the blackmailer’s immoral action, and she has no moral right 
not to give in. That is, it is the blackmailer’s fault that the person now has a duty, but it 
remains her duty, however unfairly it has been acquired. The “success” of moral blackmailing 
depends on the victim’s moral sensitivity. If the victim is sensitive to particular moral 
standards and takes herself to be subject to them, she will be more liable to moral 
blackmailing. With this analysis of moral blackmailing in place Keller shows why it is a 
moral wrong that is particularly present within families. The family – within which much of 
our caring for the vulnerable occurs – grounds relationships that generate special moral 
reasons. The sensitivity of individual family members to these moral reasons and the 
vulnerability connected to being in a close family bond can more easily be exploited. 
Divorced parents and grown-up siblings with shared filial duties are cases in point. Keller 
maintains that state policies that make use of such vulnerabilities are especially open to 
criticism. If the state fails to provide funding for the transport required by disabled children, 
for example, and burdens parents with the costs, the duty to provide such transport is shifted 
onto the parents. This policy qualifies as an instance of moral blackmail to the extent that 
parents violate a duty towards their disabled children if they do not ensure that they have 
transport. In no longer receiving funding they are left with a morally unacceptable choice. In a 
similar vein, traditional gender roles and the allocation of family duties that goes along with 
them facilitate moral blackmailing. Since women are morally judged much more frequently 
and severely than men when it comes to how much care they provide within the family, they 
are more vulnerable to being made offers they cannot refuse on moral grounds. They are 
therefore prone to a distinct kind of moral exploitation. As a result, family relations are a 
particular locus of moral blackmail.  
While Keller’s interest lies in immoralities as they arise in close family relationships in 
particular, Mullin turns to the responsibilities that parents have with regard to their young 
children – responsibilities to motivate their children to feel grateful, for example, with feeling 
gratitude in appropriate circumstances being a responsibility that even small children can 
equally be said to have.  
In her “Dependent Children, Gratitude and Respect,” Mullin defends the view that dependent 
children owe their parents gratitude for the care they provide for them under some qualified 
conditions. Mullin is reluctant to claim that children owe this in the sense of having a duty. 
She rather points out that children should be motivated to be grateful, and this is a 
responsibility that falls on parents. One might object that children should not be asked to be 
grateful for the parental care they receive given that parents have the duty to care for their 
children anyway. Furthermore, the demand to be grateful might make children feel unduly 
indebted to their parents. Against these objections Mullin argues for an account of gratitude 
that emphasizes the significance both of benevolence and of respect and distinguishes 
gratitude from indebtedness. According to Mullin, gratitude is only morally appropriate in 
response to benefits and benevolence that manifest respect for the beneficiary, and that must 
be conveyed for the right reasons and in the right way. But children could not be asked to be 
grateful if they did not have the capacity for gratitude. Mullin draws from empirical 
psychology to show that children become capable of being grateful between the ages of seven 
and ten. In that age range, children develop a sense by which they can evaluate whether they 
have received a benefit and are able to ascribe intent to the benefactor. Gratitude differs from 
indebtedness in that the object of gratitude is the altruistic benefactor’s benevolence towards 
the well-being of the beneficiary, in part at least, for his own sake. Indebtedness, by contrast, 
is a feeling that results from expectations that mostly arise for selfish reasons, and that use the 
beneficiary as a means of fulfilling those expectations.  
In addition to the benefit given benevolently, a benefactor must also respect the beneficiary so 
that gratitude is called for. Against the view that respect is only owed to fully autonomous 
persons – a view that would preclude younger children from being respected – Mullin argues 
that even young children have partial autonomy. Respect for a child thus requires attention to 
what she finds meaningful and what she values and engagement with her on these matters. 
This does not rule out paternalistic interventions being justified if the child still does not fully 
appreciate the ramifications of what she values. In such cases of paternalism, gratitude might 
be called for once the child is more autonomous and able to see the benefit of the paternalistic 
intervention. To sum up, children’s gratitude is appropriate and can thus be demanded if the 
child (i) is capable of appreciating a benefit as such; (ii) is capable of assessing the motives of 
the benefactor as benevolent; (iii) feels that she was treated with respect; and if (iv) the 
benefit was not conveyed in a context of abuse and the beneficiary has no reason to 
disapprove of it on moral grounds.  
Furthermore, Mullin draws our attention to additional reasons why it is desirable to foster 
gratitude. Gratitude helps to sustain positive relationships, and coheres with other valuable 
features of relationships, such as trust. This is why it is important to encourage gratitude not 
only in children but also in adults. If adults are grateful for the benefits children give them 
they deepen their relationship with them. In addition, adults can be role models for their 
children in showing gratitude and respect. Mullin concludes that teaching children about 
gratitude and its moral warrant may be an important moral responsibility for parents.  
To be sure, the topics presented in this special issue by no means exhaust the new 
developments that are currently taking place within family ethics. Still, they can serve as 
cases in point, however, for a new focus on more intricate moral and immoral issues as they 
become manifest between parents and children. Family ethics is a burgeoning field, and the 
articles in this special issue manifest this continuing trend.16  
 
                                                          
16 We are grateful to Alexander Bagattini and Moritz Dittmeyer for their helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this introduction. Many thanks also to Matthew Liao for inviting us to co-
edit this special issue of the Journal of Moral Philosophy. 
